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In this paper we develop two models that can be used to identify critical logistics factors that impact mili-
tary readiness and the life cycle cost.  The first one, a discrete-event simulation model, estimates the oper-
ational availability of a weapon system given input parameters under a certain scenario.  The second one, 
a spreadsheet model, computes the life cycle cost using the same input parameters for the simulation 
model.   Our approach is intended to serve as a basis for discussion between program offices concerned 
with cost and operational commands concerned with operational availability. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The development of modeling and simulation (M&S) to support Life Cycle Management is complex and 
requires a close examination of the factors involved and results obtained.  The insights derived from M&S 
can contribute significantly to operational readiness and the cost of readiness.  Consequently, research is 
needed to identify important data and key factors that affect Life Cycle Management.   
 In this paper we develop two models that can be used to identify critical factors that impact military 
readiness and the life cycle cost.  The first one is a simulation model using the Arena® simulation lan-
guage (Kelton et al. 2010). This model estimates the operational availability of a major weapon system 
given input parameters under a certain scenario.  The second one is an Excel® spreadsheet based life cycle 
cost model that computes the life cycle cost using the same input parameters for the simulation model.  
Although the life cycle cost model can be embedded into the simulation model, we intentionally separated 
it utilizing the Excel spreadsheet, so that it can be used by financial managers to conduct what-if analyses 
virtually on any personal computer without obtaining a license or learning the simulation package. 
 We have selected the Light Armored Vehicle with a 25 mm Gun System (LAV-25) for our analysis.  
Our scenario includes 76 LAV-25s to be deployed with the Marine Expeditionary Forces.  We are inter-
ested in readiness analysis for the LAV-25 fleet and in estimating the life cycle cost over a period of time 
(typically 20 years).  In this paper we only consider operations and maintenance cost without including 
infrastructure, personnel or overhead costs.  The models discussed in this paper can be applicable to any 
major weapon systems by providing new data sets.  [See studies on unmanned aerial vehicles in Kang, 
Doerr and Sanchez (2006) and Kang et al. (2010).]  
2 BACKGROUND 
The goal of military logistics support is to maintain the highest possible level of readiness, commonly ex-
pressed as operational availability:  
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where MTBM is the mean time between maintenance, and MDT is the maintenance down time, which in-
cludes repair time and administrative and logistics delay times.  Intuitively, operational availability is the 
fraction of time a weapon system is operational or mission capable. Clearly, operational availability can 
be improved by increasing MTBM (i.e., increasing reliability) and/or decreasing MDT (i.e., reducing re-
pair or cycle-time).  Thus, the two key issues to improve weapon systems readiness are reliability im-
provement and cycle-time reduction.  
 Reliability improvement and cycle-time reduction not only improve readiness but also save money.  
Better reliability requires less maintenance and fewer spare parts.  The relationship between repair or 
cycle-time and inventory levels is critically important (yet, troublesome) in the military because it crosses 
physical, organizational, and financial barriers.  Financial managers strive to consolidate and minimize 
stocks of piece-parts to free-up resources for other priorities.  They also seek to get quick turnaround on 
repairable components in order to minimize pipeline inventory.  However, stockout of spare parts or con-
sumable components results in delays in repair processes and eventually serious readiness degradation.  
Cycle-time reduction in a military logistics channel (repair depots, intermediate-level maintenance, inven-
tory control points, and supply centers) also means that more weapon systems are available in the field or 
fleet.  On the other hand, increased cycle-time causes a vicious cycle of deteriorating military readiness.  
For instance, poor logistics support (e.g., lack of spare parts, personnel, and/or training) increases the 
cycle-time, which in turn decreases readiness, Ao. Increasing operational tempo (Op Tempo) also nega-
tively affects readiness by generating more system failures, and increases the cost to support longer oper-
ating hours. 
 Understanding both military readiness and its implied cost is important to both warfighters and finan-
cial managers.  There are many factors in the military logistics system that affect weapon system readi-
ness and its life cycle cost.  Clearly, simulation models of even relatively simple logistics systems can 
have a very large number of inputs!many of which may be uncertain or unknown!that potentially im-
"#$%&%'(&)*+(,-.&"(/0*/)#1ce. Some of these inputs are reliability, maintainability, logistics delay, repair 
turnaround time, sparing and operational tempo.  In the design of experiments (DOE) literature, these are 
referred to as factors.  In real-world experiments, it is difficult to control more than a handful of factors at 
a time.  This is not the case for simulation experiments, where the analyst has the ability to specify the le-
vels (values) for all of the input factors before running the simulation.  Still, once the factors and potential 
levels have been determined, this creates a huge number of potential scenarios (or design points).  For ex-
ample, if an analyst wished to explore nine factors, each at 10 levels, there are one billion (109) different 
scenarios that could be considered. The design might need to be replicated for stochastic simulations, be-
cause specifying all input factors does not remove randomness from the output.  Such a large experiment 
is clearly impractical.  Even if it were possible to run all scenarios in a reasonable amount of time, the vo-
lumes of output data would easily overwhelm most post-processing analytic tools, leaving the analyst li-
mited in their abilities to statistically interpret the results.   Fortunately, efficient experimental designs can 
be used to specify a small number of suitable scenarios.    
 Kleijnen et al. (2005) discuss situations where various classes of designs are appropriate, but there is 
no one-fits-all design.  In our explorations of readiness and life cycle cost analysis we want to screen 
many variables for importance, while simultaneously maintaining the ability to fit complex meta-models 
to a handful of input variables that are found to have the most impact on the responses.  Given this, and 
the above design goals, the Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) design constructed by Cioppa 
and Lucas (2007) is particularly useful.   
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3 MODELS 
3.1 Simulation Model for Operational Availability 
There are 76 LAV-25s to be deployed with the Marine Expeditionary Forces.  We are interested in readi-
ness analysis for the LAV-25 fleet and in estimating a life cycle cost over a period of time (typically 20 
years).  In this paper we only consider operations and maintenance cost without including infrastructure, 
personnel or overhead costs.   
 An LAV consists of 1,570 different parts. The data we collect from the Marine Corps Decision Sup-
port System (MCDSS) indicate that the Marine Corps has spent a total of $29 million to purchase all the 
parts to maintain LAVs in 2007 2 2009.  After sorting the data in the order of the Extended Price (the total 
amount of money spent on each part; it is calculated by multiplying the part count by the unit cost), we 
note that more than $18 million dollars or approximately two-thirds of the total cost were spent on the 
five parts listed in Table 1. These parts are expensive and fail more often than others. Also these parts are 
critical, i.e., if any one of these fails, the LAV cannot operate.   We focus on these five parts for our anal-
ysis. 
Table 1: The Five Major Components for LAV (in terms of the Extended Price)[Source: MCDSS 4.3.1.1,  
PartUsage_EO947 (2007-2009)] 







1 5860014304339 SENSOR UNIT,LASER  120 $89,794  $10,775,318 $10,775,318 
2 1005015023970 CONTROL DISPLAY UNI 103 $27,683  $3,072,854 $13,848,172 
3 2520219063912 DIFFERENTIAL,DRIVING 101 $22,475  $2,269,978 $16,118,151 
4 2815014427645 ENGINE,DIESEL I 31 $41,757  $1,544,995 $17,663,146 
5 2815015502615 ENGINE,DIESEL II 36 $26,890  $1,075,609 $18,738,755 
*Extended Price = Part Count * Unit Price 
 
 In Table 2, the failure rate, the SL quantity, the criticality code and the level of repair are shown for 
each part.  In our analysis, though, we did not use the failure rates in Table 2.  Instead we allowed this pa-
rameter to vary over a fairly wide range in the design of experiments, using the NOLH.  More details on 
the design of experiments will be presented in the following sections. The criticality code (Crit Code in 
Column 5) 5 indicates all these parts are critical; any one of these parts fails the LAV cannot operate.  The 
SL quantity (Column 4) identifies the total number of part(s) that are required on a selected weapon sys-
tem. The SL quantity of the driving differential (Part #3) is 4, which is interpreted as 4 serially connected 
driving differentials in an LAV.  We are assuming that if any one of them fails, the LAV will not be oper-
ational. If the reliability of an individual driving differential is 0.90, the subsystem that consists of these 4 
serially connected driving differentials is only 0.656 (or 0.904). Thus among these 5 parts, the driving dif-
ferential (Part #3) is potentially more critical to operational availability of the LAV than other parts.  The 
SL quantity of the laser sensor unit (Part 1) is 2, which means that two of these parts are serially con-
nected.   The far right-hand-side column of Table 2 shows the level of repair for each component.  
Control display units (Part #2) and driving differentials (Part #3) are repaired at the intermediate-level (I-
level) maintenance facility while laser sensor units (Part #1), and diesel engines (Parts #4 and #5) are 
maintained at the depot level (D-level).  D-level as compared to I-level generally involves much longer 
turnaround times.   
 We consider the five critical components as shown in Table 1 for this study.  When any of these parts 
fails, the faulty part is removed from the LAV, a spare is installed, and the faulty part is sent to the repair 
facility (I-level or D-level).  After the repair is complete, the repaired part becomes a spare and is sent to 
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the spare pool.  When a critical part fails, and a spare is not available, the LAV will be non-operational, or 
not mission capable, until a spare becomes available.   
Table 2: Failure Rate, SL Quantity, Criticality Code and Level of Repair for Each Part [Source: Same as 
TABLE 1] 







1 SENSOR UNIT,LASER  0.000211638 2 5 D-level 
2 CONTROL DISPLAY UNIT 0.000363312 1 5 I-level 
3 DIFFERENTIAL,DRIVING 8.90643E-05 4 5 I-level 
4 ENGINE,DIESEL I 0.000109346 1 5 D-level 
5 ENGINE,DIESEL II 0.000126983 1 5 D-level 
 
 The ranges of %'(& 0#3,4/(& /#%(.& & 56i) of the individual parts are provided in Table 3, along with the 
ranges of the number of spare parts, repair turnaround times (I-TAT and D-TAT), and the operational 
tempo.  The failure rate 56i) is expressed in terms of the number of failures per operating hour. The mini-
)4)&6i value of 0.0001 failures per operating hour is equivalent to an MTBF of 25 years (= 1 / 0.0001 / 
400) assuming an operational tempo of 400 hours per year.  The maximum value of 0.005 failures per op-
erating hour is equivalent to an MTBF of 0.5 years (= 1 / 0.005 / 400) at the same operational tempo.  The 
spare levels are set at 1 through 10.  The I-level and D-level turnaround times are set at 5 2 15 days and 
30 2 60 days, respectively.  Since the average operational tempo during the peace time is approximately 
350 hours per year, and during the war time, is approximately 650 hours per year, we set the range of the 
operational tempo from 300 to 700 hours per year. We assume that the time between failures for each 
component follows an exponential distribution.  Our simulation model estimates the average operational 
#7#3,#83,3%9:&&;4/&<*#,&3.&%*&8(%%(/&41+(/.%#1+&'*=&$'#1<(.&31&/(,3#83,3%3(.&531&%(/).&*0&%'(&0#3,4/(&/#%(>&6 i), 
number of spares for each part, repair turnaround times, and operational tempo impact operational availa-
bility and the life cycle cost.  




0.0001 2 0.005  
failures per operating hr 
."#/(&3&5&3&?&@>&A>&B>&CD 1 - 10 
I-TAT (I-level turnaround time) 5 2 15 days 
D-TAT (D-level turnaround time) 30 2 60 days 
Op Tempo  300 2 700 hrs/yr 
 
 Several designs are possible, but we use an NOLH with 257 design points (Cioppa and Lucas 2007) 
for our 13 factors.  It can be easily constructed by entering the low and high values in Table 3 into a 
spreadsheet (Sanchez 2006) %'#%&3.&#7#3,#8,(&0/*)&EFG-.&GHHI&Jenter for Data Farming web site (NPS 
2010).   For each scenario, the simulation model reads a row of data from the NOLH spreadsheet.  
The 0#3,4/(&/#%(.&56i>&3&?&@>&A>&B>CD of the five parts are first read, followed by the number of spares for 
each part, the I-level turnaround time (I_TAT), the D-level turnaround time (D_TAT) and the operational 
tempo (Op_Temp). K'(&6i values are expressed in terms of the number of failures per operating hour.  The 
time between part failures is assumed to follow an exponential distribution for all 5 components we study. 
The repair turnaround times are assumed to follow symmetric triangular distributions with lower and up-
per bounds of 0.5(mean) and 1.5(mean), respectively.    
 The simulation model was developed using the Arena simulation language.  A brief description of the 
model logic is as follows: 
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1. Read input data for each scenario. 
2. Generate 76 LAVs. 
3. Generate part failures. (Five failure times are generated.  Whichever is the smallest value is the 
next failure time of the LAV.) 
4. The faulty part is removed from the LAV 
5. Update FMC count (fully mission capable LAVs): FMC = FMC 2 1 
6. If a spare part is available, install a spare and reset the FMC count: FMC = FMC +1.  Otherwise 
wait in the queue until a spare is available from the spare pool until after Step 8.   
7. The faulty part is sent to the repair facility. 
8. After the delay as specified in the input, the repaired part joins the spare pool. 
9. Repeat Steps #1 to #8 until the end of the simulation time. 
 At the end each of scenario, the simulation automatically calculates the operational availability: Ao = 
average FMC / total number of LAV.  FMC is a time-persistent variable (see, e.g., Kelton et al. 2010) and 
%'(&#7(/#<(&7#,4(&*0&LMJ&)4.%&8(&N%3)(-#7(/#<(+:O&&P/(1#&#4%*)#%3$#,,9&$*)"4%(s the value.   
 We run a total of 257 scenarios, each of which is simulated over a period of 1,000,000 hours and the 
first 100,000 hours of observations were eliminated to remove initial bias.  900,000 hours of simulation is 
equivalent to approximately 7 replications of 20-year simulation. The average Ao (operational availabili-
ty) from each scenario is automatically appended (see Figure 1, Column N) to the same input EXCEL 
worksheet that contains the factor values (simulation inputs).  Columns A through M contain the inputs. 
 
Figure 1. A Screen Shot of NOLH Input Parameters (Columns A through M) and Output Results (Ao in 
Column N and the life cycle cost in Column O) 
3.2 Spreadsheet Model for Life Cycle Cost    
The second model is the life cycle cost spreadsheet model that reads the same input scenarios and com-
putes the life cycle cost over the next 20 years.  The life cycle in this model only includes operations and 
maintenance costs (spare, repair, transportation, and operations costs).  
 Our scenario includes 76 LAVs.  The operational tempo (Op Tempo or operating hours) changes as 
part of the design of experiment.  We assume that the hourly operating cost to be $50, the hourly repair 
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cost, $300, and the transportation cost, $200 per failure.  The annual capital discount rate of 7%, and the 
annual inventory rate of 20% are used.  The life cycle is assumed to be 20 years for the LAV.  Any of 
these values can be modified by the user.   
 We have developed a visual basic macro program to automate the life cycle cost computation for each 
of 257 scenarios. Once the macro is executed, it reads the input parameters in each scenario (row by row) 
in Figure 2 then writes them on the highlighted cells on the spreadsheet life cycle cost model.  Once the 
spreadsheet model updates the life cycle cost, the result is written onto the same input worksheet (Column 
O in Figure 1).  This procedure is repeated 257 times (once for each design point).  When the macro ex-
ecution is complete, the life cycle cost results are on Column O, and the operational availability results 
from the simulation are in Column N, along with input parameters in Columns A through M (see Figure 
1).  Then this worksheet is imported into the software JMP® (SAS 2008) for further analysis.    
4  RESULTS 
We begin assessing the output by examining the histograms of the simulation responses.  This can be a 
=#9&*0&N#$$3+(1%#,,9O&"(/0*/)31<&7(/303$#%3*1&#1+&7#,3+#%3*1&*0&#&.3)4,#%3*1&)*+(,:&&;4/&/(.4,%.&31+3$#%(&
that the average operational availability differs widely across the different scenarios, ranging from 0.573 
to 0.995.  The average Ao across the 257 scenarios is 0.830 with a standard deviation of 0.090. It appears 
%'#%& #%& ,(#.%&*1(& *0& %'(& 31"4%& 0#$%*/.& +*(.>& 31+((+>& '#7(&#& .48.%#1%3#,& 310,4(1$(& *1& %'(& .9.%()-.&"(/0*r-
mance (See Figure 2).   
 The average life cycle cost across the 257 scenarios is $52.1 million with a standard deviation of 
$14.6 million.  The life cycle cost also differs widely across the different scenarios, ranging from $19.9 
million to $99.9 million.  It also indicates that at least one of the input factors does have a substantial in-
fluence on the life cycle cost (See Figure 3).  The darkened areas of the Ao and cost distributions corres-
pond to the subset of scenarios with lowest cost and highest Ao points, which will be explained with Fig-
ure 8.  
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Operational Availability (Op Av) 
 After confirming that the results appear reasonable, we turn to our main goals!identifying those fac-
tors and components that have the greatest impact on performance.  A useful non-parametric data analysis 
technique is the regression tree, as shown in Figure 4.    Regression trees are more human-readable and 
can be easier to describe than multiple regression models because they reveal the structure in the data in a 
simple way.  Initially, the data are grouped in a single cluster.  All potential input factors are examined to 
identify how best to split them to yield two leaves such that the variability in the response within each leaf 
decreases and the variability in the response between the leaves increases as much as possible.    
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Figure 3. Distribution of Life Cycle Cost 
Figure 4. Regression Tree for the Average Ao 
 Figure 5 shows the regression tree for predicting the average Ao from the 257 simulation scenarios.  
The dominant factor is clearly the operational tempo (Op_Temp). For example, the first split at the top 
indicates that the average Ao is 0.776 across the 104 scenarios that have an operational tempo of 539 
hours or more per year.  In contrast, the average Ao is 0.866  (11.6% higher) among the 104 scenarios that 
had an operational tempo less than 539 hours per year.  As the operational tempo increases (i.e., more op-
erating hours), the more failures occur and obviously the operational availability goes down.  In the 
second split when the operational tempo is greater than 539, the depot turnaround time (D-TAT) becomes 
a critical factor.  Then the failure rates (lambda 1 and lambda 3) of the laser sensor unit (Parts #1) and the 
driving differentials (Part #3) become critical.   
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 Regression trees are non-parametric approaches for fitting a statistical model to the simulation output.  
They can be good at identifying subsets of the output that behave much differently than the rest.  Regres-
sion metamodels can also be valuable.  They may confirm the regression tree results concerning which 
factor or factors have the greatest influence on the results, or they may allow more succinct descriptions 
*0&%'(&.3)4,#%3*1&)*+(,-.&"(rformance if it can be well-described by simple polynomial metamodels. 
 Accordingly, we fit regression metamodels of the Ao as a function of main effects and two-way inte-
ractions of the 13 input factors. After noticing that the interactions are not significant compared to the 
main effects,  we develop a simple linear model with 13 main factors without interaction effects.  The pa-
rameter estimates are shown in Figure 6. This model had an R2 of 0.90.  Large |t_ratio|s for the OP_Temp, 
lambda1, lambda3 and D-TAT show them to be the major factors, and agree with our regression tree re-
sults. Note that the numbers of spares are not as important as other factors.  This means that raising the 
spare levels from their lowest levels to the highest levels in Table 1 does not lead to appreciable im-
provement in the average operational availability.   
 
Figure 5. Sorted Parameter Estimates for Ao Model (main effects only) 
 We use the same methodology to analyze the results from the life cycle cost model.  We first observe 
the regression tree as shown in Figure 6.  Once again the dominant factor is the operational tempo 
(OP_Temp).  For example, the first split indicates that the average life cycle cost is $63.5 million across 
the 114 scenarios that had an operational tempo greater than or equal to 523 hours per year.  In contrast, 
the average life cycle cost is $43 million among the 143 scenarios that had an operational tempo less than 
523 hours per year.  As the operational tempo increases, the operating cost obviously increases, and this 
factor has more impact on the life cycle cost than any others.  In the second split, when operational tempo 
is greater than 523, the reliability of the driving differential (Part #3) becomes a critical factor. 
 We then develop regression metamodels with main and two-way interaction effects. After observing 
that the interactions are not significant compared to the main effects, we build a simple linear regression 
model, and the results are shown in Figure 7.  The R-square value for this model was 0.98, demonstrating 
that this linear regression model does an excellent job of explaining the variability in the life cycle cost 
model. Again we see that operational tempo is the most critical factor followed by lambda3 and lambda1 
(the failure rates of Part #3 and #1).    However, the repair turnaround times (I-TAT and D-TAT) do not 
have much effect on the life cycle cost. As the repair turnaround times increase, the operational availabili-
ty deteriorates, yet the operations and maintenance cost will not be affected.  However, there is an implied 
waste of money since the repair pipeline inventory will go up as the repair turnaround time increases. 
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Figure 6. Regression Tree for the Life Cycle Cost 
 The number of spares for Part #1 (the most expensive one among the five parts selected for analysis) 
seems to be more critical than other spares, yet the number of spares in general does not have much im-
pact on the life cycle cost.    
 
 
Figure 7. Sorted Parameter Estimates for the Life Cycle Cost Model (main effects only) 
 Lastly, we compare Ao and life cycle cost together in a scatterplot, given in Figure 8.  The darkened 
points correspond to those scenarios with lowest cost and highest Ao.  There is an obvious negative corre-
lation between the two measures, with higher operational availability generally leading to lower overall 
life cycle cost.  In examining the input factor distributions for these selected points (not shown here), we 
find that the factor with the most explanatory power for achieving both lower cost and higher Ao together 
is operational tempo.  The next most driving influence for both measures considered together is the failure 
rate of Part # 3. These darkened points are also shown as the darkened areas in the distribution graphs of 
Figures 2 and 3.  
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Figure 8. Scatterplot of Cost vs Ao 
5 REMARKS 
The most critical factor is the operational tempo for both Ao and the life cycle cost. The more you oper-
ate, the more it fails and the more it costs. Then the reliability plays an important role.  Those parts with 
high failure rates are more critical (e.g., Part #1 and Part #3).  D-level turnaround times as well as I-level 
turnaround times are also critical factors for Ao. Those with longer repair turnaround times [e.g., Part #1 
fails less often than Part #3, yet its repair turnaround time is much longer (D-level maintenance) than that 
of Part #3 (I-level maintenance)] tend to be more critical for Ao.  The repair turnaround times do not have 
much direct impact on the life cycle cost, since, in the life cycle spreadsheet model, the spare level for 
each component was predetermined for each scenario.  However, in reality if the repair turnaround time 
gets longer, managers tend to purchase more spares to improve readiness, yet those newly acquired spares 
will only spike the operational availability for a short term.  Eventually those newly acquired spares will 
fail and get stuck in the repair pipeline without improving Ao in the long run if the repair turnaround time 
is not reduced.   
 In conclusion, both warfighters and financial managers should understand the importance of logistics 
and impact of reliability, cycle time and operational tempo on readiness and life cycle cost.  Our approach 
is intended to serve as a basis for discussion between program offices concerned with cost and operational 
commands concerned with operational availability. 
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